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The response of local markets to sectoral and macroeconomic policy changes is a
key determinant of the long term impact of policy reforms on reforming economies. In
other words, changes in arbitrage costs that are associated with policy reforms as well as
the level of integration among local markets exert a strong influence of the economic
outcome of reform programs. The objective of this paper is to explore this question
theoretically and empirically. 
A model that can be used to capture the long term process that is involved has
been developed and tested using data from Ghana. The model is later applied to analyze
the outcomes of further liberalization of groundnut markets in Senegal. The findings
highlights the potential cost of failing to pay sufficient attention, when liberalizing
domestic markets, to the emergence of a competitive and efficient private distribution
sector. The results also indicate that, when state-run processing sectors with monopoly
power are involved, effective liberalization of pricing and marketing policies in all
likelihood would not yield the anticipated benefits, unless accompanied with efforts to
improve productivity and cut unit costs of production in the processing sector.    
1. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental question that remains unanswered in most countries undergoing
economic reform concerns the extent to which local markets respond to sectoral and
macroeconomic policy changes. The objective of this paper is to explore this question
theoretically and empirically, and to assess the respective roles of spatial integration and
arbitrage costs in explaining price changes resulting from economic reforms. The work has
been motivated i) by concerns that price changes are poorly transmitted between central
and regional markets in rural Africa, and ii) by a recognition that the way in which
agricultural producers and consumers react to changes in sectoral, trade, and
macroeconomic policies depends upon the extent to which local market prices respond to
changes in central market prices. These issues are of both major policy concern and
continuing academic interest. On the one hand, considerable attention has been focused on
the relative isolation of rural markets and the implications of this isolation for agricultural
producers and consumers (e.g. de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991; Fafchamps,
1992; Saha and Stroud, 1994). On the other hand, policy makers in countries with large
processing sectors are often worried about the impact of liberalizing crop procurement
systems on the competitiveness of these sectors. 2    
 Throughout the paper, the terms arbitrage cost, marketing cost, or transfer cost will be
1
used interchangeably.
The present paper examines the implications of market integration and changes in
arbitrage costs  for i) the adjustment of local markets to pricing and marketing policy
1
reforms and ii) the induced impact on the competitiveness of agricultural processing
activities. It is based on a dynamic model of price formation that uses estimates of spatial
integration and arbitrage costs across local markets to gauge the response of local
agricultural prices to policy changes.  The model is first applied to data from Ghana to test
its robustness in retracing ex-post the price adjustment process in selected local market
areas over the 10 year period that followed the introduction of policy reforms in that
country in 1983. It is then used to examine the impact of liberalizing domestic groundnut
markets in Senegal on prices in the main production region and the resulting effects on the
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 The definition of a central market is one that leads the price formation process amongst a
2
network of interdependent markets.
2. MODELING THE ADJUSTMENT OF LOCAL PRICES TO POLICY CHANGES
Assume a local market L, the price in which is determined by the price in a
reference or central market C . We denote the local and central markets by the
2
superscripts L and C, respectively. The relationship between the prices in the two markets
can be written as:
(1)
With prices measured in levels, the intercept in equation (1) denotes fixed costs of
marketing, and the coefficient of P , the price in the central market, measures a proportional
C
markup, i.e. the cost of arbitrage between the latter market and the local market. Although
equation (1) is instructive, it does not capture the dynamic nature of the relationship between
prices in the two markets. For that purpose, a fully specified dynamic model has been used.
Using j to indicate lags, and using X to denote a matrix that includes an intercept, a time trend,
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(3)
(4)
The interpretation of equation (2) is as follows: if $ =0 ￿ j then the local market is j 
segmented from the central market, meaning that it operates independently from it and that
policy-induced changes in the latter are not transmitted to the former market. In contrast, if   $0
=1 then price changes are immediately transmitted from the central market to the local market.
Furthermore, if the central and regional markets are integrated in the long run, then E" + E$
=1, and the number of lags required to ensure this equality provides evidence of integration that
is less immediate than instantaneous price transmittal. Standard F- and t-tests applied to
estimated coefficients of equation (2) can be used to investigate hypotheses regarding short-run
or long-run integration.
Given an initial shock to the central-market price, the dynamics of the adjustment
process between two markets involve a series of interim multipliers as the induced deviations
of prices from their equilibrium values fluctuate, converge, and then stabilize. In the context of
the model introduced above, the cumulative effect after j periods of a central-market price
shock on the price in an outlying market can be computed as: 
Complete adjustment of the process is given by the long-run dynamic multiplier:
The speed of price transmission can be calculated by computing the time J that it takes
for the intermediate multipliers to convergence within a certain range of the long-run5    
multiplier. The convergence rule is to find J such that |$ / $- 1| < , and |$ / $- 1| < , for every J              6 
j > J , where , is a tolerance limit and $  is the estimated multiplier after j periods. 6
The process of market integration that is summed up in equations (3) and (4) needs to
be linked to that of local price formation in order to model the adjustment of market prices to
policy changes. Figure 1 offers a graphic illustration of the adjustment process, as it is treated
in the model. In line with the observed changes in Ghana, the first case that will be studied with
the model, the central price is shown here to decline following the introduction of reforms in
period t (See Alderman and Shively, 1996). The model of spatial integration predicts that the a 
change in price (a) in the central market will translate to a change in price (b) in the local
market between the time t  and the time t , a period that may range from a few weeks to a a        a+1
few months. The ratio b to a correspond to the long run multiplier that is estimated with
equations (3) and (4).
The derivation of the long-run multiplier assumes the existence of arbitrage between
the central and local markets. The multiplier can, therefore, be understood as reflecting the
process of price adjustment in the local and central markets to changing supply and demand
conditions in these markets. Moreover, because arbitrage costs play a key role in determining
both the level and speed of adjustment of market prices to changes in supply and demand
conditions, changes in these costs should be expected to affect the price adjustment process.
The failure of the conventional integration model to capture this effect seriously diminishes its


























6    
changes in marketing policies lead to reactions in the marketing system which in turn affect the
costs of moving commodities across local markets.
Figure 1--Dynamics of Local Price Adjustment
(a = ) P ; b =) P ; J = speed of transmission)
C       L
ta       ta+1
The model of local price adjustment that is developed below is, therefore, based on the
following reasoning. If $ is the estimated value of the long run multiplier between the j
C, L 
central market and a given local market after j periods, then the time path of prices in the local
market can be expressed as a function P  ( $ , )T , P , P  ), where )T  stands for the t     j       ta   ta+1













































7    
change in costs of spatial arbitrage, P  the pre-reform price level in the local market at time
L
ta
period t , and P  the price level after the shock has bean absorbed by the local market at a      ta+1
L
time period t  (see Figure 1). a+1
The contemporaneous relationship between the local and central market prices, P  and
L





Where T   stands for the cost of arbitrage between the local and central markets. Recall
L
from equation (5) defines the dynamic long-run equilibrium relationship between the price in a
given local market and the price in the central market. It expresses the cumulative adjustment
of the local price to changes in the central-market price in previous periods. Approximating
derivatives by first differences, and defining as one period the h units of time required for the
long run multiplier to converge to its long run value, equation (3) can be rewritten as:
(7)




Rearranged slightly, equation (8) yields a second-order linear difference equation that
can be solved to obtain local prices P  as a function of the long run multiplier $   and local
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 See Badiane and Nuppenau (1997).
3
 Differentiating equation (10) with respect to $ gives the impact of improvements in the
4
degree of market integration on the time path of local prices (see Badiane, 1996: pp. 14-
15).
Equation (9) in turn can be solved for P   (see Tu 1994, pp. 46-50), which obtains the
L
following expression for the time path of local prices:
3
(10)
Equation (10) expresses the local-market price at time t as a function of the initial (pre-
reform) price, the long-run multiplier, and the change in arbitrage costs )T. In other words,
changes in the degree of market integration or the cost of marketing not only affects local
prices contemporaneously, but also affect the evolution of these prices over time.  The
4
expression for the time path of local prices derived here exposes the relationships between
spatial integration among local markets, the cost of local arbitrage, and the adjustment of local
prices to shocks in leading markets.
The model presented above can now be used to examine the role of the marketing
system in transmitting the effects of policy reforms. To that end, it is assumed that policy
changes first affect prices in the lead markets either because these are major zones of
production or trading centers. These markets lead other neighboring markets in the price
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 Badiane (1996) and Badiane and Nuppenau (1996) discuss ways to model these effects.
5
to the latter markets depending on their corresponding degrees of integration. Accordingly, the
first step in modeling the transmission process is to model the effect of reforms on the central-
market price.  To do this, note from the previous section that P  in equation (10) can be




In contrast, P  has to be calculated to reflect the immediate transmission of the
 L
(t=1)
impact of policy change in time t=1 to local markets following the adjustment of prices in the
central market. For example, assume a one-time shock in the central market. Further, assume
that local markets have finished adjusting to this shock. Now, defining as one period the time it
takes for the long-run multiplier to converge to its equilibrium value, then the price in the local
market at time t=1 is:
(12)
Recall that T  is the cost of spatial arbitrage before the introduction of reforms, and (t=0)
that P   is the pre-reform price observed in the central market.  Substituting these two into
C
(t=0)
equation (12), and using the identity given by equation (11), provides the values of  P   and
L
(t=0)
P   that are required to compute the local time path described by equation (10). Equation
L
(t=1)
(10) thus allows us to estimate the time path of prices in the local market following a shock in
the central market. In the next section the model is used to estimate the ex-post impact of
economic reforms adopted by the Ghanaian government in 1983 on prices in two major local
markets.   
3. SIMULATING THE ADJUSTMENT OF PRICES TO POLICY CHANGES IN GHANA
In 1983, Ghana launched an Economic Recovery Program (ERP), which among other
eliminated many of the government interventions in the maize marketing system that in the past
had helped depress real maize prices (Stryker, 1991). Currency devaluation was a centerpiece
of Ghana's reform program, and between April 1983 and October 1985, the Cedi exchange
rate to the US dollar fell from 2.75 to 60. Despite the previous policy-bias against the
agricultural sector, the reforms were accompanied by a decline in real maize prices, as shown in
Table 1. Furthermore, the analysis of maize prices by Badiane and Shively (1998) suggests that
marketing margins have been shrinking throughout the post-reform period. The observed
decline in prices may reflect the improvements in the transport sector and the reduction in
marketing costs that followed the introduction of the reforms (Jebuni and Seini, 1992; Stryker,
1991). 
Table 1--Evolution of Local Maize Prices During Reforms
Wholesale Prices Spatial Price Spread
Techiman Makola Bolgatanga Techiman-Makola Techiman-Bolgatanga
1980/84 42.38 41.60 41.64 0.78 0.75
1985/89 22.58 22.62 22.57 -0.04 0.01
1990/93 23.40 23.64 23.90 -0.24 -0.5011    
The analysis will focus on three major market areas in Ghana: Makola, near the coastal
area around the capital city Accra; Techiman in the main maize producing area in the center of
the country; and Bolgatanga along the Northern border with Burkina Faso. Techiman was
previously identified as the lead market in the price discovery process among the three markets
(Badiane and Shively, 1998). The model presented above will therefore be tested by simulating
the time paths of prices in Makola and Bolgatanga as functions of the shock to prices in
Techiman following the introduction of reforms in 1983, and the level of interdependence and
the change in arbitrage costs between the latter markets and Techiman. 
The first step in simulating the adjustment of local prices in Makola and Bolgatanga is
to estimate the long-run multipliers between each of these markets and the Techiman market
using cointegration analysis. Several pathways are available to test for cointegration of the
local and central market price series. The procedure employed here is the Phillips-Oularis-
Hansen procedure outlined by Hamilton (1994), using residuals from market-specific
regressions based on equation (1). The equation is estimated for Bolgatanga and Makola with
Techiman as the central market and the residuals from the regressions are retained and
regressed on their lagged values, using a first-order autoregression (AR1) process. The results
of the regressions are presented in equations (a1) and (a2) in the appendix. Subsequently, two
tests of stationarity are conducted: the Phillips-Oularis Z-test, which is based on the AR1
residuals with undifferenced data; and the augmented Dickey-Fuller t-test, which is based on
residuals using first-differences. The tests conducted at the 95 percent confidence level against12    
 See Badiane and Shively (1988).
6
 The test produced ARCH test statistics of 10.6 and 11.7 for Bolgatanga and Makola,
7
respectively, which in both cases exceed the P  one-percent critical value of 6.63.
2
a true specification including the constant and the trend both reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration .
6
The second step in the simulation of the post-reform time paths of prices in Makola
and Bolgatanga is to estimate the dynamic price equations described by equation (2) for each
of these markets in relationship to the Techiman market. Based on the results of the
heteroskedasticity tests, which rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedastic variance, an
ARCH estimation procedure was applied to the equation.  The results obtained for Bolgatanga
7
and Makola are presented in equations (a3) and (a4) in the appendix.
The values and significance levels of the coefficients for the Techiman price (P )
 TE
reject both the hypotheses of segmentation or immediate integration between the two markets
and the Techiman market. However, the tests for long-run integration could not be rejected at
standard significance levels. Furthermore, for models with 4-period lags in each market, the
test of integration based on the criterion that E"+E$=1, also failed to be rejected. In most
cases, the strength of the integration relationship improves as additional lags are added, but the
results do not change markedly beyond four lags. In short, these regression results support
conjectures by Alderman (1993) and Asante, et al. (1989) that maize markets in Ghana are
relatively well integrated.13    
The dynamic multipliers with respect to the price in the central market of Techiman
that are obtained from the estimated price equations are 0.27 and 0.54 for Bolgatanga and
Makola, respectively. The multipliers with respect to the respective local prices are 0.69 for
Bolgatanga and 0.52 for Makola. Thus, unlike in Makola, these estimates indicate that local-
market price history in Bolgatanga is much more important in the price determination process
than the central-market price. The estimates in both cases are consistent with the hypothesis of
long-run integration, with the sum of parameters reaching 0.95 for Bolgatanga and 1.06 for
Makola. Moreover, the computation of Timmer’s Index of Market Connectedness (IMC)
yields a value that is greater than 2 for Bolgatanga and one that is slightly less than 1 for
Makola. These values underscore that the Bolgatanga market is relatively less integrated with
the Techiman market than is the Makola market.
To obtain estimates of the time paths of local prices in each of the two markets,
equation (10) is computed using the multiplier values with respect to the Techiman market of
0.27 for Bolgatanga and 0.54 for Makola. For comparison, estimates of long-run multipliers
reported in the literature for other African countries typically range from 0.4 to 0.6, indicating
that the estimate for Bolgatanga is relatively low (Badiane et al., 1997). The estimated time
required for full transmission of the initial price shock between Techiman and the other two
markets, that is the period from t  to t  in Figure 1, is about four months in each case. This a    a+1
measure of the speed of adjustment determines the length of the unit of time t that is used in the
analysis. Accordingly, 4-month averages of prices and arbitrage costs are used in the
simulations of the price time path that are presented below. In other words, P  and P
 L      C
(t=0)    (t=0)14    
represent four-month averages of local (Bolgatanga and Makola) and central market
(Techiman) prices at the time of reforms. The devaluation of April 1983 is used as a
benchmark for the reform period. Thus, P   and P  represent the observed average
L      C
(t=0)    (t=0)
prices in the second four-month period of 1983, May 1983 to August 1983, which in Figure 1
corresponds to t . Based on the estimated speed of transmission of four months, the first four-  a
month period of 1984 is used as t  The local price, P , computed using equation (12),  a+1.           (t=1)
 L
also corresponds to that period.
The observed changes in spatial price spreads between Techiman, on the one hand, and
Bolgatanga and Makola, on the other, are used as proxies for the changes in arbitrage costs,
again using the same four-month time unit. Given that equation (9) was solved as a non-
homogenous second-order difference equation, implying a constant )T, the average change in
spatial price spreads between the individual four-month periods is used in the computations.
During the period for which equation (10) is computed and which goes from the second four-
month period of 1984 (II/84) to the second four-month period of 1993 (II/93), the average
change in arbitrage cost between Techiman and Bolgatanga was -0.5 Cedis per four month-
period. Between Techiman and Makola, the corresponding figure was -0.4 Cedis (Badiane and
Shively, 1998)
Simulated time paths of prices for Bolgatanga and Makola are presented in Figures 2
and 3, respectively. The bottom line [APRICE] in Figure 2 shows the evolution of observed
prices in Bolgatanga. The straight line [EPRICE] is the ex post simulation of these prices,
which is computed using equations (10) and (12), the pre-reform prices, the long run multiplier15    
 Prices in Techiman fell from 53.17 to 40.54 Cedis between III/83 and I/84 while
8
arbitrage costs between the two markets fell by an average of 0.5 Cedis every four-month
period between III/84 and II/93.
between Bolgatanga and Techiman (0.27), the observed decline in arbitrage costs between the
two markets (-0.50), and Techiman prices observed immediately prior to and after the 1983
devaluation. The simulation results indicate that the some of the price decline in Techiman has
indeed been transmitted to the Bolgatanga.  However, given the relatively weak link between
8
Techiman and Bolgatanga, the contribution of Techiman price changes to price changes in
Bolgatanga was fairly small. These results are well in line with the findings from the spatial
integration model, which indicated that Bolgatanga prices are determined primarily by their
own past values and local factors underlying them. In fact, based on the relatively low level of
interconnectedness between Techiman and Bolgatanga one would expect that only a small
amount of any price change in the former would be transmitted to the latter. To the extent that
the weak connection between these markets is a reflection of a low level of arbitrage between
them, one would also expect the changes in arbitrage costs to have limited impact on the
evolution of Bolgatanga prices.
The importance of spatial integration for price adjustment process is confirmed by the
results for the better connected Makola market (Figure 3). As before, the [EPRICE] line
represents the simulated time path for Makola and the [APRICE] line the observed prices.
Recall that the value of the long run multiplier for Makola is 0.54, double that for Bolgatanga.
As a result, the simulated price line in Makola displays a much greater impact of the price16    
shock in Techiman on local prices. The adjustment process is much stronger here, despite the
fact that the observed reduction in arbitrage costs between Techiman and Makola (-0.40) was
25% smaller than that observed between Techiman and Bolgatanga (-0.50).
To show the importance of market connectedness for the response of local prices to 
changes in Techiman prices and arbitrage costs, equation (10) is solved again for Makola,
using different values for the long-run multiplier and the changes in arbitrage costs. In Figure 4,
the top line [LRM=0.25] represents the simulated price time path in the Makola market
assuming a 50 percent lower long-run multiplier value of 0.25 and the same change in
arbitrage costs. The bottom line [LRM=0.54] corresponds to the line [EPRICE] in Figure 3
and is included here for comparison. Contrasting the two simulated time paths, one sees that
poor market integration helps to explain the limited impact of the decline in Techiman prices
and arbitrage costs on prices in Bolgatanga. One sees for example, how similar the new
simulated time path in Figure 4 is to the simulated price line in Figure 2.
Finally, two additional versions of equation (10) are computed using the data from the
better integrated Makola market, to gauge the sensitivity of local price changes to changes in
the costs of arbitrage. In the first version, the average decline in arbitrage costs in each period
between Techiman and Makola is reduced by half to -0.2 but using the same long-run
multiplier. In the second version, the average arbitrage cost is increased by 0.5 Cedis in each
period. The top line [DARB=0.5] in Figure 5 indicates the simulated time path with increasing
arbitrage cost. The middle line [DARB=0.2] is the price path with the lower decrease in
arbitrage costs. It can be observed that the increase in arbitrage costs has a large impact on the17    
time path of local prices, in fact leading to an increase in Makola prices, despite the decline in
prices in Techiman. As expected, the increase in arbitrage costs dampens the impact of the fall
in Techiman prices. Not only do prices in Makola decline less in the early period as a result of
increasing arbitrage costs, they even begin to rise after just a few periods. 
The simulation results presented in the preceding sections show that the ultimate
impact of policy reforms on local market prices is not only a function of the extent of the initial
shock, but also of the degree of interdependence across local markets and any associated
changes in the costs of moving goods between markets. Because policy reforms often include
the liberalization of domestic marketing systems and thus the adjustment by traders of their
marketing operations, the model laid out here presents a clear advantage over conventional
integration analysis regarding the study of the impact of economic reforms on agricultural
markets. In the second part of the paper, the model is therefore used to examine how the
liberalization of the groundnut procurement systems in Senegal would affect the procurement
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Figure 5—Arbitrage Costs and Adjustment, Makola Market   
4.  GROUNDNUT MARKETING POLICY REFORMS IN SENEGAL
After decades of extensive intervention in groundnut markets, the Senegalese
government initiated a reform program in 1985, with the objective of increasing private sector
participation and raising efficiency in the procurement system.  The main rationale for state
intervention in the groundnut sector has been to safeguard the viability of state-owned
processing mills.  Consequently, the government has slowly and only partially liberalized
groundnut markets, as illustrated by i) the exclusion of the processing sector from the reform
program; ii) the continued control of the procurement system of unshelled groundnuts through
the official system of agricultural cooperatives and a network of private traders, the
Operateurs Prives Stockeurs (OPS), procuring exclusively on behalf of the marketing
parastatal, SONACOS; and iii) the continued administration of uniform pan-territorial and pan-
season prices during the administratively determined official marketing season.
The partial approach to reforming the groundnut sector  has lead to a dual marketing
system with, on one hand, a sub-system controlled by the state and consisting of agricultural
cooperatives and the OPS, and on the other hand, an informal sub-system of independent
private traders.  The official system controls the distribution of unshelled groundnuts which are
delivered exclusively to processing mills. The market for shelled groundnuts, in contrast, is
controlled exclusively by private traders who increasingly also compete with the official system
in the procurement of unshelled groundnuts.  The dichotomy of the system, which to a certain
extent, is a tradition in the groundnut sector of Senegal, has been reinforced in a pronounced23    
way by the partial approach of the 1985 reforms.  The partial liberalization has created two
distinct segments in the procurement and distribution system. Each of these segments operates
essentially at a different time of the year, focuses on different types of groundnut by-products,
serves different geographical areas, and sells to different customers. The official system
operates only during the four-month long official marketing season, while the private system is
active all-year long. The official system handles only unshelled groundnuts and sells exclusively
to the processing plants located mostly in the port-city of Dakar.
Moreover, despite the adoption of the reforms, the policy environment of the
groundnut marketing system is still strongly affected by many of the restrictions from the pre-
reform period. Eventhough they are not being enforced, the government has not been willing
to take transparent and unequivocal steps in removing most of these restrictions. Private
traders, as a result, tend to be skeptical of the determination of the government to tolerate their
activities, particularly as they are increasing their share of the market of unshelled groundnuts.  
Indeed, many private traders think that the relative freedom they currently enjoy could still be
questioned at any time.  They view their participation in groundnut marketing as being
tolerated, but not legalized.  This situation obviously has a negative impact on the attitude of
the entrepreneurs who would otherwise like to invest fully in these activities.
The partial and segmented approach to the reform of groundnut markets is reflected in
the behavior of prices in local markets.  The barrier segmentation between the official and
private channels has contributed to disconnecting the process of price formation in the markets
for shelled and unshelled groundnuts. This segmentation  is reflected in 1) the considerable24    
 See Badiane and Gaye. 1997.
9
variation of the price ratios between the two groundnut products across neighboring markets;
2) the much higher  volatility of prices for unshelled groundnuts in the same markets; 3) the
large number of markets displaying very dissimilar price seasonality patterns, despite the fact
that the production and harvesting patterns are the same in the different areas; and 4) the
substantial variability in  spatial and temporal price spreads for similar distances and for the
same types of groundnuts in neighboring markets in the main production zone .
9
The pricing behavior described above suggests that the reforms introduced in 1985
have not resulted in the emergence of an efficient marketing system.  Prevailing pricing and
marketing policies affect not only the operation of local markets, but also the profitability of 
farming and processing activities alike. Policy reforms may, therefore, be associated with
important revenue transfers between the production and processing sectors. Effective reform
of these policies would inevitably result in a redistribution of these transfers. The analysis of the
redistributive effects of an eventual deepening of the reform programs and their implications for
the competitiveness of the groundnut sector is a critical input into the preparation of additional
liberalization measures that are currently under discussion.   
  In comparison, exports from the non-members of the Conseil Africain de l’Arachide
10
have increased by around 50 percent during the same period (Badiane and Kinteh, 1994:
p. 25).
5. MARKET LIBERALIZATION AND COMPETITIVENESS OF 
GROUNDNUT PROCESSING 
Even after the reforms, government pricing and marketing policies sought to protect
the processing sector, while severely taxing groundnut producers. The magnitude of the
taxation is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows that the share of groundnut farmers in the
export price has consistently been lower than 60 percent. Given the consequences of such a
bias for long term productivity in the groundnut farming sector, the advantage of lower raw
material prices enjoyed by the processing sector has not been sufficient to sustain its
competitiveness. Output stagnation and even decline in the farming sector has led to increasing
excess capacities in the processing sector, which has resulted in a substantial hike in the unit
cost of processing. The taxation of the production sector was especially high during the
seventies. It more than doubled during this period, leading to a substantial change in Senegal's
role in the global groundnut economy. From the sixties to the middle of the eighties, the
country's share in world production of groundnuts decreased from 6 to 4 percent, and its share
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Figure 6--Sector Policies and Taxation in the Groundnut Sector 
Note:  Price data used is from Freud et al. 1997
The subsequent drop in world prices and the gradual appreciation of the country's
currency led to a dramatic change in the transfer effects of pricing policies towards the end of
the eighties and the early nineties. They resulted in a significant decrease of the gap between
export and producer prices.  For several years, producer prices were even higher than export
prices, inducing heavy losses for the processing industry. By the early nineties, the chronic
deficits in the processing industry had exacerbated the deep crisis in the farming sector. 
Under the objective of revitalizing the groundnut sector, the reform programs describe
earlier were launched during the mid-eighties. The center-piece of the reforms has been the27    
 The nature and the weaknesses of the liberalization programs are discussed in detail in
11
Badiane and Gaye (1997). 
promotion of participation by private traders in groundnut sector procurement . The
11
government has now realized that the current reforms have not been sufficient to bring about
significant changes in the groundnut sector. The deepening of the reform program of the early
eighties, as it is currently being discussed, would require an effective liberalization of the
groundnut sector, which means allowing domestic and external market forces to dictate prices,
opening the procurement system to private traders by removing the remaining obstacles to
entry and the free movement of groundnut products. Such changes would lead to an increase in
competition in local markets, a reduction in marketing costs, and improved integration among
local markets. Effective liberalization of domestic groundnut markets is most likely to lead to
an increase in producer prices and, therefore, to higher raw material prices for the processing
industry.
It was indicated previously that one of the main concerns of the government with
respect to reforms in groundnut sector is the anticipated  impact on profitability in the
processing industry.  In the following sections of the paper, the model introduced earlier will be
used to examine the potential impact of further liberalization of domestic groundnut markets on
prices in the main producing region around Kaolack and on prices in Dakar, the main area of
implementation of groundnut processing plants. The underlying reasoning is that in the context
of liberalized markets, industry procurement costs would be determined by market prices in the
Dakar region. Furthermore, the adjustment of prices in the Dakar market that would be28    
induced by policy changes would take place gradually rather than immediately. Hence, the
application of the model, which captures not only the immediate adjustment but also retraces
the time path of prices in the local market in Dakar, long after the initial shock. In accordance
with equation (10), changes in prices in Dakar would be a function of  i) the degree of
integration between the markets of Kaolack and Dakar; ii) the initial price change in the
Kaolack market; and iii) the changes in arbitrage costs between the two markets.
Accordingly, the individual steps in the estimation of the impact on prices in Dakar of
price changes in Kaolack, following a full liberalization of pricing and marketing policies,
consist in calculating 1) the anticipated changes of producer prices in the area of Kaolack, 2)
the degree of integration between the markets of Kaolack and that of  Dakar, and 3) the
changes in inter-market arbitrage costs between the two zones.  To estimate the changes in
producer prices, it is assumed that post-reform prices in Kaolack would be equal to the farm-
gate equivalent of export prices, that is the prevailing world price minus the transfer cost
between Kaolack and Dakar, which is also the main point of export.  To estimate the degree of
integration between the markets of Kaolack and Dakar, co-integration analysis is applied to the
series of prices in these two markets, as explained in section 2. Equation (3) and (4) are then
computed to obtain the long-term multipliers, which measure the degree of price
interdependency between the Kaolack and Dakar markets.  For the changes in arbitrage costs,
the actual changes in price differences observed between the two markets are used. The model
is estimated retrospectively to examine the likely impact of further liberalization of price and
marketing  policies in the groundnut sector.  The computations are based on a hypothetical29    
 The integration results obtained there indicate that Kaolack is indeed leading the price
12
formation process between the two markets. Accordingly, Dakar is specified as the local
market and Kaolack as the central market. Hence, P  and P   in the equations refer to
 L     C
prices in Dakar and Kaolack, respectively.
complete liberalization of markets in 1992. The simulated results are then contrasted with
actual prices and profit levels in the sector to illustrate the potential ramifications of furthering
the reforms started in 1985. The simulation of the effects of liberalizing groundnut markets
during the period that is considered has to take into consideration the impact of the
devaluation of the country's currency which occurred in early 1994.  The five year period
covered by the estimations, which goes from July 1992 to July 1997, has therefore been
divided into two sub-periods: a first one extending from July 1992 to the date of the
devaluation in February 1994, and a second sub-period that covers the remaining years.
For the first step of the analysis, that is the estimation of the integration model, the
results obtained in Badiane and Gaye (1997) are used .  The integration analysis was carried
12
out not only for the pair Kaolack-Dakar, but for all main groundnut markets in Senegal. 
Monthly price data from the different markets was used. For the Kaolack-Dakar market, the
co-integration analysis provided a long term multiplier of 0.52, with an adjustment speed of
one month.  In other words, price changes in Kaolack during the five years covered by the
estimations were transmitted to the market of Dakar at a rate of 52 percent after a period of
one month. Moreover, the average cost of arbitrage between the markets of Dakar and
Kaolack have declined over the study period at a rate of 0.29 CFA per month.  Based on the30    
 The model uses monthly price data, so that a shock introduced in July is reflected in the
13
price level of August.
above information, the post-reform prices in Dakar can be computed using equation (10), if the
initial change in prices in Kaolack resulting from the liberalization of pricing and marketing
policies is known. Table 2 presents the prices that are used in the simulation and explains how
they have been derived.  
The simulations are carried out for two sub-periods. The first period covers the 18
months preceding the devaluation of the Franc CFA in February 1994.  For this sub-period, the
effects of the reforms are simulated by adjusting the prices in Kaolack in July 1992         (P 
k
= 188.58), assuming that an effective liberalization would have decreased them in the (t=0)
following period, that is in August 1992, to the level of export prices in Dakar, adjusted for the
cost of transfer between Kaolack and Dakar .  As explained in the notes to Table 2, the price
13
under liberalization is obtained by using as reference price the average world price between
1988 and 1992.  Given the large fluctuations of international market prices, this choice seems
more judicious than choosing the price that prevailed in August 1992 as the reference price. 
With an average of 130.23 CFA and transfer costs between Kaolack and Dakar of 50 CFA, the
initial price in Kaolack that would have resulted from the liberalization is estimated to be, P 
k
= 80.23.  Using the above figures for P    and P    and the transfer costs observed (t=1)                   (t=0)       (t=1)
 k       k
between Kaolack and Dakar, the initial change in the Dakar price from P    to P     can be
 d       d
(t=0)       (t=1)
calculated using equations (11) and (12).  By inserting the values for  P   and P 
d      d
(t=0)      (t=1)
determined in equation (10) and by using the values of 0.52 for the long term multiplier ($) and31    
-0.29 for the average change in transfer costs ()T), the impact on the time path of prices in
Dakar that would have resulted from the liberalization of groundnuts market in July 1992 can
be simulated.
Table 2--Data Used for the Estimation of the Time Path of Prices in Dakar
Pre-devaluation period Post-devaluation period Long term Change in
multipliers transfer
















188,58 80,83 217,13 31,47 274,73 253,41 93,47 0,52 -0,05
Source: UPA, Ministry of Agriculture
 Price of shelled groundnuts in Kaolack in July 1992.
a
 Calculated as the world price in August 1992 of 98,09 CFA per kilogram, minus estimated transfer costs of 50.00 CFA/kg
b
between Kaolack and Dakar for the same period.
 The Dakar price in July 1992. 
c
 Simulated price for the Kaolack market in February 1994, assuming that the groundnut markets have been liberalized since
d
1992. This price is obtained by subtracting the transfer or marketing costs between Kaolack and Dakar from the price
simulated for Dakar in February 1994, P .
d
(t=2/94)
 Calculated as the world price in March 1993 of 377.29 CFA/kg, minus the marketing costs between Kaolack and Dakar for
e
the same period, which is 62.00 CFA/kg.  This price is used for the “autonomous adjustment” version.
 Calculated as the average world price from 1994 to 1997, minus the marketing costs  of 62.00 CFA/kg between Kaolack and
f
Dakar for the same period.  This price is used for the “guided adjustment’ version, which assumes the existence of a
mechanism to align domestic prices to the expected average of prices over the period 1992 - 1997.
 Simulated price for Dakar in February 1994, assuming a complete liberalization of markets since July 1992.
g
Note:  Given the difficulties in getting information on the actual cost of marketing or arbitrage, the observed average margin
between prices in Dakar and Kaolack is used as a proxy.
For the post-devaluation period, the simulation must take into account the change in
parity.  Given that the simulations assume that markets have been liberalized since 1992, the
market price in Dakar at the moment of the devaluation must correspond to the simulated
export price in Kaolack plus the transfer costs to Dakar.  Consequently, the pre-devaluation
price in Kaolack, that is P   , is obtained by deducting from the simulated price for the
 k
(t=2/94)
Dakar market at the end of the period, that is P    , the transfer costs between the two
d
(t=2/94)32    
markets at the moment of the devaluation.  Following the change in parity in February 1994,
the immediate post-devaluation price in Kaolack, P   , has to be adjusted to fully reflect the
 k
(t=3/94)
change in the exchange rate. The new reference price for Kaolack is, therefore, calculated as
the export price in March 1994 minus the transfer cost to Dakar, converted at the new
exchange rate (see table 2).  Equation (11) and (12) are then used to compute the immediate
change in  the price in Dakar, P   .  Assuming that $ and )T have the same values as
 d
(t=3/94)
during the pre-devaluation period, equation (10) is computed again to simulate the time path of
prices in Dakar, had the government allowed producer prices in Kaolack to fully reflect the
effects of the change in parity of the CFA Franc in the context of liberalized domestic markets.
As explained before, the initial post-devaluation price in Kaolack is derived from the
world price by deducting the transfer costs at the moment of the devaluation.  Therefore, it was
necessary to choose a reference price to represent the world price at the beginning of the post-
devaluation period.  This has led to the following two versions of the model.  The first version
supposes an autonomous adjustment of prices in Kaolack to the change in parity, using as
reference the world price just after the devaluation of the Franc CFA, i.e. in March 1994. The
second version assumes a guided adjustment and uses as the reference price the average world
market price between 1994 and 1997.  The idea behind the notion of guided adjustment is the
existence of a mechanism that works to align  producer prices to long-term trends in
international markets rather than exposing them to short-term fluctuations.  For both versions,
as well as for the simulations for the pre-devaluation period, the simulated price is the retail
price in Dakar for unshelled groundnuts.33    
The simulation results are reported in Figure 7.  It  displays the time path of prices in
the Dakar market, which would have resulted from the liberalization of pricing and marketing
policies back in July 1992. The lines describe the evolution of the ratio between the simulated
price and the observed pre-reform price in Dakar in July 1992, assuming fully liberalized
markets as of July 1992, and thus a complete transmission of the change in parity to producer
prices in Kaolack.  The thick line corresponds to the version of the model that assumes an
autonomous adjustment of producer prices to their international level.  The dotted line
correspond to the version with guided adjustment.  These two lines, which are identical for the
period before devaluation, indicate that a complete liberalization of the groundnut markets
would have induced a decline in prices by as much as 55 percent in Dakar during the 18
months preceding the devaluation of the CFA Franc.  Figure 1 showed that producer prices
between 1992 and 1993 have in fact been higher than Senegal’s export price, which itself  was
higher than the world market price, as a result of EU financed export subsidies.  The
subsequent drop in world market prices and the appreciation of the CFA Franc, combined with
already excessively low producer prices in real terms, which the government was hesitant to
decrease further, caused prices in the Dakar market to rise to more than twice the world price
level.  The stepped line, on the other hand, describes the evolution of actual producer prices
relative to their July 1992 level. The observed increase of about 20% during the last months of
1993 and just before the devaluation reflects the effect of a retrospective adjustment of official
prices that took place around the end of the marketing season in late 1994, months after the








7/92 12/92 5/93 10/93 3/94 8/94 1/95 6/95 11/95 4/96 9/96 2/97 7/97
Price g.a. Price a.a. Producer price
34    
period is at the source of the enormous deficits that have plagued the groundnut processing
industry for years.
Figure 7--Price Adjustment in the Dakar Market
Note: The lines indicate the ratio of simulated and producer prices to their pre-reform values
in 7/92.  Price g.a. = price simulated under guided adjustment scenario; Price a.a.=
price simulated under autonomous adjustment scenario.
With the change in parity that occurred in February 1994, prices in Dakar would have
been, by the second half of 1994, 50 to 60% higher in the case of liberalized markets.  The
simulated price is higher for the version assuming autonomous adjustment, because it is based35    
on a world price that is higher than the one underlying the simulations under the guided
adjustment version.  It is also interesting to note that during the post-devaluation period,
producer prices show a trend that is somewhat similar to that of simulated prices.  In other
words, the successive adjustments in producer prices made by the government after the change
in parity have raised them in the same proportions as market prices would have increased under
full liberalization. Hence, the ratios of the simulated market and actual producer prices to their
respective values of July 1992 all lie around 1.6 at the end of the simulation period.
The changes in policies that are simulated here raise key questions relating to their
effects on production incentives and on cost levels, and thereby, profitability in the processing
sector.  The comparison between producer prices and simulated prices in Figure 7 does not
allow a full appreciation of the changes in incentives nor does it allow for the appreciation of
the revenue transfers between the production and processing sectors that are associated with
the shift in incentives.  For that purpose,  the analysis must take into account not only the
difference between simulated and actual prices, but it must also take into consideration changes
in procurement and processing costs.
The actual evolution of profitability in the processing sector during the period covered
by the study is first examined to obtain a benchmark on which to base the analysis on the
transfer effects that would have resulted from the liberalization of domestic groundnut
markets.  Table 3 below calculates the profit margins in the  processing industry on the basis of
different constellations of groundnuts and oil export prices and groundnut procurement costs. 
The two export prices that are used correspond to the world market price (PEM) and36    
Senegal’s export price (PES), the latter taking into account the 10% subsidy granted by the
European Union for groundnut oil exports from Senegal (Freud et al: p. 139).  It is important
Table 3--Pricing Policy and Profitability in the Processing Industry
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
In CFA per kg of shelled groundnuts
Senegal export price (PES) 95 124 302 268 266
1
World market price (PEM) 87 112 275 244 242
Processing cost (CTB) 32 69 28 33 33
 
Gross margin @ PES (MBS) 64 54 274 235 233
Gross margin @ PEM (MBM) 55 43 247 210 209
Transfer price FGPA (PFG) 121 104 208 232 249
2 *
Collection costs  (PFC) 161 179 200  232 249
2,3 *
Net margin @ PPS & PFG (MSG) -57 -50 67 3 -16
Net margin @  PPS & PFC (MSC) -97 -125 74 3 -16
Net margin @ PPM & PFG (MMG) -66 -62 39 -22 -41
Net margin @ PPM & PFC (MMC) -106 -136 47 -22 -41
Source: Basic price and cost data are from Freud et al (1997).
 CIF price for raw groundnut oil in groundnut in shell equivalent based on a conversion coefficient of 1.86.
1
 Sale's prices and assembly costs reported by SONAGRAINE for unshelled groundnuts, converted to shelled groundnut
2
prices using a conversion rate of 0.65.
 Assembly costs incurred by SONAGRAINE for procuring one kilogram of unshelled groundnuts, converted to shelled
3
groundnut prices using a conversion rate of 0.65.
* After the cancellation of the agreement that called for SONAGRAINE to supply processing mills at subsidized prices, the
prices PFG and PFC are supposed to be equal to the prevailing producer price of 131 CFA plus SONAGRAINE’s assembly
cost of 31 CFA per kilogram, assuming that the costs are the same in 1996 as for 1995.  The price of groundnuts in shell
thereby obtained is translated into shelled equivalent by using a conversion rate of 0.65.
PES: World price plus the 10% subsidy from the European Union.
MBS: Equals (PES-CTB)  * 0.65.
MBM: calculated in the same way as MBS by using PEM in stead of PES.
CTB: Processing cost of exported raw oil reported by SONACOS.  Given that 1.86 kg of groundnuts in shell yield 1
kilogram of oil, the costs reported by the SONACOS must be divided by this factor to obtain the processing cost per kilogram
of groundnuts in shell.
MSG= PPS - PFG;  MSG= PPS-PFC
MMG= PPM - PFG;  MMC= PPM - PFC37    
to distinguish between the two prices in order to adequately evaluate the competitiveness of
Senegalese exports. By deducting the processing costs (CTB) that are derived from table a1 in
the appendix from the export prices, we obtain the gross price margins on the basis of the
world export price (MBM)  and on the basis of Senegal's actual export price (MBS).  The
possible net price margin after processing is then estimated by subtracting the costs of the
quantities of groundnuts used from the gross price margins.  The cost of groundnuts are
calculated first on the basis of the actual prices (PFG) charged by SONAGRAINE, the
procurement arm of the public processing company SONACOS.  SONAGRAINE supplies
unshelled groundnuts to the company's processing mills in Dakar often at subsidized prices that
are well below the sum of the producer price plus assembly and transport costs. Alternatively,
the cost of groundnuts to the processing mills are calculated on the basis of a price (PFC) that
would at least cover SONAGRAINE’s actual procurement cost, that is producer price plus
assembly and transfer cost to Dakar.
Depending on the export price that is used and the definition of groundnut costs to
processing mills, four different estimates of net margins in the processing sector are obtained.
The net margins for the last five years are presented in the last four rows of Table 3. For 1992
and 1993, the estimates indicate losses by the processing mills which vary between 50 and 136
CFA per kilogram of processed shelled groundnuts. As has already been mentioned, the mills
would not have been able to absorb these losses if there were no subsidies granted within the
framework of the agreement with the procurement company SONAGRAINE (Freud et al,: p.
76). As would be expected, these losses are less important when the higher actual export price38    
(PES) is used instead of the world price. For the following two years, still on the basis of the
actual export price, the net margins realized by the groundnut oil mills varied from 3 to 74 CFA
per kilogram. If they were to export at world market prices, the oil mills would not have
realized any profit until 1994. Because of the drop in the world prices, they would have
suffered losses of about 22 CFA per kilogram in 1995. For the last year, the losses incurred
would have been 16 to 40 CFA per kilogram. Therefore, it appears that the positive effect from
the CFA devaluation on the processing sector would has lasted only a very short time and
would have been much less significant if the oil mills had to export at world market prices. The
two main factors that explain this development are the increase in groundnut procurement
prices, which have doubled during the post-devaluation period, and the drop by almost 60% of
the world prices after 1994.
Pricing and exchange rate policies do not only affect the profitability of the processing
activities, they are also associated with revenue transfers between the production and the
processing sectors. Given that the distribution of these transfers would be affected by changes
in pricing policies, it is of interest to know the implications of furthering the reform process in
Senegal’s groundnut sector in that respect. The level of transfers can be estimated on the basis
of the simulated prices that are discussed above, the processing costs in the milling industry,
the procurement costs of groundnuts, and the producer prices. Tables 4 and 5 show the results
of such computations. In the first table, the simulated price (PEA) is based on the
“autonomous adjustment” version of the model, which assumes an immediate and full
adjustment of prices in Kaolack to the change in the CFA parity starting in March 1994. The39    
price (PEG) in the second table is based on the “guided adjustment” version of the model, in
which prices in Kaolack are initially set to reflect the long-term development of world market
prices. In both cases, two different estimates of processing costs will be used. The first
Table 4--Market Liberalization and Inter-Sector Transfer (Autonomous Price Adjustment) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
In CFA per kg of unshelled groundnuts
Simulated price, automatic adjustment (PEA) 72* 62 187 229 226
1
Processing cost (CTB) 21 45 18 22 22**
 
Reference processing cost (CRT) 14 14 14 14 14
Maximum procurement price of oil mills @ CTB (PAB) 52 17 169 207 205
Maximum procurement price of oil mills @ CRT (PAR) 58 48 173 214 212
Private sector marketing cost (FCP) 70 24 39 75 50
Maximum producer price @ CTB (PMAB) -18 -7 130 132 154
Maximum producer price@ CRT (PMAR) -12 24 134 139 162
Actual producer price(PPP)  80 80 100 120 125
Transfer producers￿oil mills @ CTB (TAB)  -98 -87 30 12 29
Transfer producers￿oil mills @ CTR (TAR) -92 -56 34 19 37
 This corresponds to the simulated price (PEA) minus all other cost of processing but that of groundnuts.
1
* The simulation being based on a hypothesized liberalization of the markets in mid-1992, the adoption of the simulated price
for the harvest of 1992 assumes that it could have been sold at this price.
** Processing costs in 1996 are supposed to be the same as in 1995.
PEA: is the simulated price in the Dakar market assuming an autonomous adjustment of prices in Kaolack following a
liberalization of the marketing system since July 1992. It is a proxy of the price that oil mills would have to pay for
groundnuts under liberalized markets.
CTB: is SONACOS’ processing cost for one liter of oil, converted in unshelled groundnut equivalent at the conversion
rate of 2.86 (see Freud et al. P.90 for the source of these costs).
CRT: is equal to SONACOS’ processing cost adjusted for the difference between its milling costs and that of its
European competitors which amount to around 200 French francs per liter of oil, converted into unshelled groundnut
equivalent, using the conversion rate of 2.86. Except for the year 1993, these costs are about 41,000 French francs per metric
ton.
FCP: Marketing costs in the private sector, using as proxy the average difference between prices for unshelled
groundnuts in the Kaolack and Dakar markets. 
PAB= PEA - CTB; PAR= PEA - CTR;
PMAB= PAB - FCB; PMAR= PAR - FCP;
TAB= PMSAB-PPP; TAR= PMAR - PPP.40    
Table 5-- Market Liberalization and Inter-Sector Transfer (Guided Price Adjustment) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
In CFA per kg for unshelled
groundnuts 
Simulated price, guided adjustment (PEG) 72* 62 176 214 211
Processing cost (CTB) 21 45 18 22 22**
 
Reference processing cost (CRT) 14 14 14 14 14
Maximum procurement price of oil mills @CTB (PGB) 52 17 158 192 190
1
Maximum procurement price of oil mills @CRT (PGR) 58 48 162 200 197
1
Private sector marketing cost (FCP) 70 24 39 75 50
Maximum producer price @ CTB  (PMGB) -18 -7 119 117 139
Maximum producer price @ CRT  (PMGR) -12 24 123 124 147
Actual producer price(PPP)  80 80 100 120 125
Transfer producers￿oil mills @ CTB (TGB)  -98 -87 19 -3 14
Transfer producers￿oil mills @ CTR (TGR) -92 -56 23 4 22
 This corresponds to the simulated price (PEG) minus all other cost of processing but that of groundnuts.
1
* The simulation being based on the hypothesis that the markets have been liberalized in 1992, the adoption of the simulated
price for the harvest of the year 1992 assumes that it could have been marketed at that price.
** Processing costs in 1996 are supposed to be the same as in 1995.
PEG: is the simulated price in the Dakar market assuming a guided adjustment of prices in Kaolack following a
liberalization of the marketing system since July 1992. It is a proxy of the price that oil mills would have to pay for
groundnuts under liberalized markets.
CTB: is SONACOS’ processing cost for one liter of oil, converted in unshelled groundnut equivalent at the conversion
rate of 2.86 (see Freud et al. P.90 for the source of these costs).
CRT: is equal to SONACOS’ processing cost adjusted for the difference between its milling costs and that of its
European competitors which amount to around 200 French francs per liter of oil, converted into unshelled
groundnut equivalent, using the conversion rate of 2.86. Except for the year 1993, these costs are about 41,000
French francs per metric ton.
FCP: Marketing costs in the private sector, using as proxy the average difference between prices for unshelled
groundnuts in the Kaolack and Dakar markets. 
PGB= PEG - CTB; PGR= PEG - CTR;
PMGB= PGB - FCP; PMGR= PGR - FCP;
TGB= PMGB-PPP; TGR= PMGR - PPP.
estimate of processing costs corresponds to the observed actual processing costs (CTB) in the
milling sector. For the second estimate (CTR), the observed costs are adjusted for the
difference between the milling costs in Senegalese factories and that of their European41    
 This comparison is legitimate since SONACOS is well in a position to acquire the
14
milling technologies used by its competitor in Europe.
competitors . The objective behind this adjustment is to take into account the inefficiencies in
14
Senegal’s processing sector. Finally, because liberalization of domestic markets would imply
that oil mills would have to procure through the private marketing system, the observed price
spreads for unshelled groundnuts between the markets of Kaolack and Dakar are used as
proxies for the procurement costs of the processing industry in the context of extended
reforms. Most likely, these costs represent maxima, because liberalization in all probability
would result in a decline of the costs of operation within the private sector for the reasons
mentioned earlier.
In the context of liberalized and competitive markets, the simulated price minus
processing costs and marketing costs determines the maximum producer price that
SONACOS would be able to pay for groundnuts. The difference between this price and the
actual producer price gives an idea of the magnitude of the implicit revenue transfer between
the production and the processing sectors. The two last rows of the tables present these
transfers i) on the basis of the observed processing costs (TAB or TGB) and ii) after adjusting
these costs for the excess cost of milling of SONACOS over its European competitors (TAR
or TGR). The negative values indicate revenue transfers in favor of producers. The magnitude
of the transfers during the first two years is identical for the two versions because the
difference with regard to the simulated price enters the computations only for the post
devaluation period. The total transfer in favor of producers amount to between 56 and 98 CFA42    
per kilogram of procured groundnuts during the pre-devaluation period. These transfers are
caused mostly by the downward rigidity of producer prices in the face of declining world prices
and the continued appreciation of the CFA. At the observed processing costs, the unit value of
the implicit transfer per kilogram in favor of producers is well above the producer price for this
period. In other words, at the prevailing costs of processing, world prices, and CFA exchange
rate just before the devaluation, the oil mills have lost for each kilogram of processed
groundnuts more than the direct cost of these groundnuts. Stated alternatively, the oil mills
should have been paid to procure the groundnuts from the producers, a fact that is reflected by
negative prices (PMAB) and (PMAR) for this period.
The situation described above was tenable only because of the significant subsidies
mentioned earlier. In the absence of a dramatic increase in world prices, the devaluation of
1994 has been the only way of avoiding bankrupting the entire processing industry. But the
change in parity has led to a change in the direction of transfers in favor of the oil mills. This
time, the transfers are caused primarily by the incomplete transmission of the change in the
exchange rate to producer prices, while export prices, on the other hand, have completely
adjusted to the new exchange rate.  For the version that is based on autonomous price
adjustment, the estimated unit value of the transfers from the producers to the oil mills varies
from 10 to 30 percent of the producer price. These transfers become much more important if
the excess in milling costs is taken into consideration. The results in Table 5, which suppose a
post-devaluation price adjustment that is managed in order to align groundnut producer prices
to the long-term trends in world prices, show lower but still positive levels of transfers. The43    
only exception is the year 1995, which reveals a modest transfer of less than three percent in
favor of producers, based on actual processing costs. These transfers, however, become
positive if we take into account the extra processing costs in the groundnut oil industry.
In short, it emanates from the simulation exercises that the devaluation of the CFA in
1994 and the failure to adjust groundnut pricing and marketing policies have given rise to
considerable implicit transfers from producers to processing mills; just the opposite of what
happened during the last few years before the CFA devaluation. Therefore, a liberalization of
these policies should be expected to redistribute these transfers in favor of producers. The
mechanism through which this redistribution would take place is primarily through the
adjustment of producer prices and therefore a hike in raw material costs for the oil mills. This
does not cause only a profitability problem to the processing industry, it also raises the
question of competitiveness of Senegalese groundnut oil exports in international markets. In
the following sections, the effects on the competitiveness of Senegal’s oil exports that would
result from a full liberalization of pricing and marketing policies are analyzed.
Figure 8, gives a better idea of the transfer and taxation effects resulting from the
pricing and marketing policies and their liberalization. The thick and the small dotted lines
describe the simulated prices as explained previously. The thin line represents the retail price
observed in the Dakar market, and the large dotted line is the price at which SONAGRAINE
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Figure 8--Market liberalization and Groundnut Prices in Dakar (Unshelled Groundnuts)45    
For the pre-devaluation period, the price at which SONAGRAINE delivered
groundnuts to the mills is very close to the price that would have prevailed in the Dakar market
in the case of fully liberalized domestic groundnut markets. However, the actual price in the
Dakar market during that period is much higher than these two prices. Different factors are at
the root of the gap observed between the actual market price and each one of the other two
prices. For instance, the difference between the simulated free market price and that of
SONAGRAINE is explained, on the one hand, by the difference between SONAGRAINES’
assembly and transfer costs of groundnuts to the processing plants in Dakar and the costs of
arbitrage between Kaolack and Dakar for the private sector. On the other hand, and
particularly for the pre-devaluation period, the difference is explained by the fact that
SONAGRAINE was selling the procured groundnuts to the oil processing company
SONACOS at prices much below the total of the incurred assembly costs, plus the prices paid
to producers (see Freud et al: p.81). As to the difference between the actual market price and
the simulated price under liberalization, it is explained by the appreciation of the CFA Franc,
the level of world prices and markets conditions in the growing regions, which determine the
level of purchase prices of private traders. It must be mentioned here that the transfer cost of
groundnuts to Dakar for the private sector does not influence the price difference because the
simulated prices are based on the assumption that these costs remain constant. It is interesting
to note that, for the post-devaluation period, actual market prices have gradually moved to the
level of simulated prices under full liberalization. The SONAGRAINE price, however, has46    
remained consistently below the level of the simulated prices, despite its substantial increase
after the change in parity. 
Figure 8 also shows that prices paid by SONACOS factories to SONAGRAINE for
the procured groundnuts are much lower than the actual prices in the Dakar market, both for
the periods before and after devaluation. However the actual market prices should not be the
reference against which SONAGRAINE’s prices can be evaluated, the reason being that the
former prices do reflects the level of producer prices, which in turn are influenced by the
prevailing pricing and marketing policies and are, therefore, bound to change in the case of
liberalization. Consequently, the simulated prices offer a better reference to evaluate the
adequacy of SONAGRAINE’s pricing policy. A comparison between these two prices shows
that for the pre-devaluation period, SONAGRAINE prices were very close to the levels that
would have prevailed in the case of liberalized groundnut markets. It appears, therefore, that
the subsidy mechanism under the agreement between SONACOS and SONAGRAINE has
been effective during the pre-devaluation period in mitigating or even eliminating the effects of
marketing and exchange rate policies on the procurement cost of processed groundnuts for the
oil mills. In fact, the prices paid by the oil mills to SONAGRAINE were much lower than the
prices paid by the latter to producers, even without including the assembly and transfer costs.
In contrast, the difference between the simulated prices and the SONAGRAINE prices, shows
that groundnut costs to the SONACOS plants would be even lower, if they had to procure
directly from the Dakar market under complete liberalization. The findings are different after
the currency devaluation. For the post-devaluation period, actual market prices in Dakar are47    
 The simulated price shows the price in Dakar under liberalization. To obtain the
15
producer price under liberalization, the arbitrage costs between Kaolack and Dakar have
to be deducted. Thus , the revenue transfer in favor of producers is in fact greater than
shown by the distance between the two price lines.
close to their simulated levels under liberalization, while SONAGRAINE prices remained at
much lower levels. Consequently, a complete liberalization of domestic groundnut markets and
a full transmission of the change in parity to producer prices would lead to considerably higher
procurement costs for the oil mills, compared to the SONAGRAINE system. 
It becomes clear that the fundamental problem of furthering the reform process and
liberalizing pricing and marketing policies in Senegal’s groundnut sector is the profitability and
competitiveness of the processing industry. The impact that complete market liberalization
would have had on financial results and competitiveness is illustrated in Figures 9 and 10. The
first figure shows that before the currency devaluation, producer prices were much higher than
all other prices that are reported in the figure, indicating revenue transfers in favor of producers
that would be eliminated under liberalized markets. The size of the transfers is reflected in the
distance between the producer price line and the simulated time path of prices under the guided
adjustment scenario . Consequently, the producers would have been among the first to lose if
15
markets were liberalized during the pre-devaluation period.
It can also be observed that for the same period, the SONAGRAINE price at which oil
mills have procured groundnuts, is higher than the price under liberalization. The prevailing
procurement arrangements thus amounted to a direct taxation of the processing industry.48    
 It is important to mention here that the comparison is based on the world price and not
16
the Senegalese export price. The later used to be subsidized by the EU and therefore is not
an adequate reference in judging the competitiveness of Senegalese exports.
However, the taxation was lower than the amount of transfers to producers, because
SONAGRAINE used to absorb a portion of the cost of the transfers, by selling the procured
groundnuts to the processing mills at prices that were much lower than the prices it paid to
these producers (see the distance between the SONAGRAINE price line and the producer
price line). 
Figure 9 also shows that the SONAGRAINE price paid by oil mills has gradually
moved towards world price levels after the CFA franc devaluation, especially after 1995.
Producer prices, on the other hand, have remained relatively low, due to the failure by
SONAGRAINE to fully transmit the effect of the change in the exchange rate to producer
prices. The taxation has thus shifted from the processing to the farming sector, which loses 30
to 40 CFA per kg of procured groundnuts. Even more important is the fact that the simulated
price, which is the hypothetical price that would be paid by oil mills on the free market in
Dakar under full liberalization, is considerably higher than the world market price. It should,
however, be noted that the simulated price is a function of both the initial change in the
producer price and the cost of arbitrage in the private sector between the production zones of
Kaolack and the market in Dakar. What this means is that further market liberalization without
a substantial reduction of operating costs within the private trading sector would have
significant negative consequences on the competitiveness of the processing industry . The
1649    
 The price spread for shelled groundnuts is used instead of that for unshelled groundnuts
17
because the latter is observable on the Dakar market only during a short period of time.
scope for reduction in marketing costs under liberalized markets will therefore be of a crucial
importance to the overall performance of the groundnut sector. Such a reduction in marketing
cost would not only reduce the supply cost to the milling industry but would also increase
prices received by producers. 
The role of marketing cost can be better appreciated by looking at the illustration in
Figure 10. The simulated price, which is represented by the bold line and is the same as in the
previous Figure, is based on arbitrage costs that are equal to the average spatial price spread
observed in 1994 for shelled groundnuts between the markets of Kaolack and Dakar and
which amounts to 62 CFA / kg . For the sake of comparison, the assembly and transfer costs
17
of SONAGRAINE between the same markets and for the same year is 30 CFA (Freud et al.; p.
81). In 1993, the average price margin between the Dakar and Kaolack markets was 25 CFA
for unshelled groundnuts (Badiane et al.; 1997 p. 91). It seems, therefore, that a reduction of
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Figure 9--Pricing Policy and Competitiveness in the Milling Industry



































































































































































51    
Figure 10--Arbitrage Costs and Competitiveness
Source: Oil World, for the world market price; prices are for unshelled groundnuts. 
To illustrate the importance of such a reduction in marketing costs, prices under
liberalization were simulated again for the post-devaluation period, assuming: a) initial transfer
cost at 25 instead of 62 CFA /kg at the beginning of the liberalization period in 1992 and b) a
progressive reduction of these costs to bring them down to 10 CFA at the end of the
simulation period in July 1997. The fine line shows the evolution of the simulated price with
the reduction in the marketing costs that is described above. At lower cost of marketing, the
simulated price drops to levels that are comparable to that of world market prices, bringing the
unit costs of groundnut procurement for the processing industry in line with international
levels, thereby restoring its competitiveness. This adjustment could be much faster, if the52    
decrease in marketing costs could be effected within a shorter period. The impact of the
reduction of operating costs in the marketing sector on producer prices is equally important.
As shown by the dotted line, the simulated producer price rises to 160 CFA against actual
producer prices of 120 to 130 CFA for the entire period covered by the analysis. 
The results summarized by the figure underline the importance of paying sufficient
attention to the emergence of an efficient and competitive private marketing sector in case of
full liberalization. The marketing of agricultural products is characterized by economies of
scale which means that the cost of operations in the sector decrease when marketed volumes
increase (Badiane et al.: 1997). The private sector currently controls less than 15 percent of the
total marketed quantities. With increasing participation by private traders, the average level of
activities within the sector should increase to allow for a significant decrease in average
marketing costs. However, the pillars of 1985 reforms, that is the sub-contracting of private
traders by SONACOS combined with the system geographic quota and local monopsony, are
not compatible with the objective of reducing unit costs in the marketing system. The same can
be said about the illegal taxation and abusive administrative controls which are encouraged by
the current political environment of the marketing sector and which contribute to raising
traders’ operating costs. 
The results also show that complete liberalization of pricing and marketing policies
necessarily has to go hand in hand with a substantial improvement in efficiency within the
processing sector. Without a considerable cut in the unit cost of processing, the adjustment of
domestic prices to international levels would lead to huge losses for the groundnut oil industry53    
and a strong decline in competitiveness for Senegal’s groundnut oil exports. Therefore, one
must recognize that the problems plaguing the groundnut sector go beyond that of pricing and
marketing policies or that of production technology. Paradoxically, the revitalization program
being discussed still focuses exclusively on production issues. It is true that the problems of soil
fertility and access to seeds constitute a critical challenge to the groundnut industry. However,
one must not forget that the productivity problem will not be solved without an improvement
in production incentives which necessarily have to complement the technological efforts. This
has to be done through the elimination of the implicit taxation emanating from the pricing and
marketing policies, (i.e. through the liberalization of domestic markets). However, market
liberalization would be beneficial only if accompanied with appropriate measures in order to a)
reduce the costs of operation in the private groundnut distribution sector well below their
current levels, and b) significantly improve the level of productivity and lower unit costs of
processing in the milling sector.     
6. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis presented in this paper highlight the importance of market integration and
changes in arbitrage costs for the adjustment process among local markets to economic policy
reforms. A model was developed to capture the long term process involved and was tested
using data from Ghana. The model was subsequently applied to analyze the implications of
further liberalization of groundnut markets in Senegal for the competitiveness of its groundnut
oil processing industry. The findings highlight the potential cost of failing to pay sufficient
attention when liberalizing domestic markets to the emergence of a competitive and efficient
private distribution sector. The results also indicate that when state-run processing sectors with
monopoly power are involved, effective liberalization of pricing and marketing policies in all
likelihood would not yield the anticipated benefits, unless accompanied with efforts to improve
productivity and reduce unit costs of production in the processing sector. The reason is that
frequently under the constellation of state monopoly in processing and marketing, pricing and
procurement policies are primarily geared towards ensuring profitability in the processing
sector. The consequence is often heavy taxation of farmers and generous subsidization of the
processing sector, thereby reducing the need to raise efficiency in that sector. The level of
productivity in the processing sector then becomes a major hurdle in liberalizing pricing and
marketing policies, because of the feared effects on the competitiveness of the processing
sector. The Senegal case study has indeed revealed that, in the absence of a considerable
reduction in the unit cost of processing in the country's groundnut milling industry, the55    
adjustment of domestic prices to their international levels that would result from further market
liberalization would lead to enormous losses for the oil industry and a sharp decline in the
competitiveness of Senegalese exports.56    
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Table a1-- Processing Costs of Raw Groundnut Oil (CFA per metric ton)
Cost categories 1992 1993 1994 1995
Production of raw oil 266,790 306,380 407,302 462,012
Preparation for exports        16,960 16,960 30,528 31,000
Total cost of raw oil  283,750 323,340 437,830 493,012
  including milling cost 27,494 50,232 31,161 41,347
1
Cost of groundnuts 225,128 194,211 386,100 431,165
2
Processing cost of raw oil 58,622 129,129 51,730 61,847
  including excess milling cost 17,494 40,232 11,161  21,347
3
Reference processing cost 41,128 88,897 40,569 40,500
Source: Freud et al (1997)
 By comparison, milling costs in Europe are around 200 French franc per metric ton of shelled groundnuts, which
1
corresponds to 10,000 CFA before devaluation and 20,000 after 1994..
 The cost of the quantity of groundnuts (2.86 metric tons) required for the production of one metric ton of groundnut oil is
2
calculated on the basis of the actual price paid by oil mills to SONAGRAINES.
 Difference between SONACOS’ milling costs and that of its European competitors (see note 2), that is SONACOS' actual
3












2 0.41 Autocorr. factor 0.364













2 0.15 Autocorr. factor 0.449



































































































































Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Mean and variance regressions contained a production measure in addition to 11 monthly
dummy variables corresponding to January-November.